Recent Melitz-type (2003) intra-industry heterogonous trade models argue that a …rm's productivity has signi…cant e¤ects on the …rm's exports. This paper examines how a …rm's credit constraints as well as its productivity a¤ect its export decisions.
Introduction
A widely accepted belief about a …rm's heterogeneous export behavior is that a …rm with higher productivity would generate greater revenue and thus be able to shoulder the …xed costs of market entry (Melitz, 2003) . This interpretation abstracts from …nancial frictions that may arise from the …rm's access to liquidity or to external …nance. In the presence of …nancial frictions, however, …rms face di¤erent borrowing constraints, which could in turn a¤ect their capabilities to …nance the upfront entry costs. In addition, inward foreign direct investment (FDI) may provide an alternative source of low-cost funds and alleviate credit constraints faced by …rms. These possibilities raise the following questions: How do …rms'credit constraints a¤ect their exports? Do credit constraints vary across …rms' types?
This paper addresses the issue by providing a general-equilibrium Melitz-type (2003) model to analyze the impact of a …rm's heterogeneous external …nance capability on its exports. There are two main innovations in our theoretical model. First, …rms' export projects have di¤erent probabilities of success. More importantly, the heterogeneous probabilities of success induce di¤erent capabilities of …rms to obtain external …nance from …nancial intermediaries. Secondly, di¤erent types of …rms have di¤erent abilities to obtain low-cost funds from sources other than …nancial intermediaries. In particular, subsidiaries of multinational corporations are able to receive …nancial support from their parent …rms to bypass domestic credit constraints.
Inspired by the theoretical predictions, we estimate the e¤ect of a …rm's credit constraints on its exports, using a very rich panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing …rms over the period of [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . We obtain robust empirical evidence that …rms with fewer credit constraints exports more, while controlling for the endogeneity of credit constraints.
Overall, one percentage increase in a …rm's interest expenditures, which is used as a proxy for the …rm's capability to borrow, increases its exports by percentage, ceteris paribus. In 1 addition, foreign-invested-enterprises (FIEs) in China export more and are less sensitive to the availability of external …nance indicating that the presence of foreign capital does alleviate the credit constraints faced by …rms. Finally, various sensitivity checks strongly support our empirical …ndings.
This work adds to a small but growing literature on trade and …nance, including work done by, among others, Qiu (1999) , Chaney (2005) , Manova (2008) , Muûls (2008) , and Buch et al. (2008) . Inspired by Melitz (2003) , Chaney (2005) …rst introduced liquidity constraints into the heterogeneous …rms model and predicted that …rms with higher liquidity endowment would face fewer …nancial constraints and it would consequently be easier for such …rms to enter the export market. As a pioneering work in the …eld, Chaney (2005) theoretically focused only on the impact of a …rm's internal funds on its exports. Then, Manova (2008) took a step forward to consider …nancial contracts and asset tangibility in a framework of …rm heterogeneity. She found that, using sector-level panel data of bilateral exports, those industries in more …nancially developed countries are more likely to export bilaterally and to ship greater volumes.
In addition, Muûls (2008) combined both liquidity endowments and external …nancial contracts into a general equilibrium model and showed that the credit rating, the Coface score from a credit insuring company, has signi…cant e¤ects on a …rm's exports. However, Muûls's theoretical model assumes equal cost of external …nance following Manova (2008) .
That is, the repayment required for an identical principal is the same across all …rms. Last but not least, Buch et al. (2008) investigated the impact of credit constraints on exports and outward FDI, including …rm heterogeneity in borrowing costs in a partial equilibrium framework. In retrospect, all these works have enriched our understanding of the impact of a …rm's credit constraints on its export behavior.
Most of the previous studies assume that, other than productivity, …rms are di¤erent only in terms of the principal amount they need to borrow. Once this amount is given, there are no di¤erences in repayments. This stems from the assumption made by these 2 studies that the default rates across …rms are the same. Our work introduces two more sources of heterogeneous credit constraints. Project-speci…c risks lead to di¤erent borrowing capabilities and capital from foreign parent …rms causes …rms to be less dependent on external …nance. These additional sources of credit constraints lead to a better …t to reality. Equally importantly, though some of the previous studies worked on …rm heterogeneity theoretically, they estimated their models only at the country and sector level, in part due to data restrictions. In the present paper, we are able to test our theoretical predictions using disaggregated …rm-level data from China.
These …ndings are of special interest because China's exports experienced unprecedented growth over the past decade whereas Chinese …rms faced severe credit constraints. [Insert Figure 1 Here] The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes mechanisms by which a …rm's credit constraints a¤ect its exports. Section 3 constructs a model introducing a …rm's heterogeneous access to external …nance and the impact of external …nance impact on the …rm's exports. Section 4 presents the econometric speci…cation and data. Section 5 discusses the estimation results and provides robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
Exploring the Impact of Credit Constraints on exports
The role of a …rm's productivity in its exports has been discussed in the literature. The seminal work by Melitz (2003) highlights that the most e¢ cient …rms export and earn extra pro…ts abroad. Less e¢ cient …rms can only serve the domestic market since the entry to the foreign market would generate losses due to …xed entry costs. In contrast, the least e¢ cient …rms die and exit from the market.
Inspired by pioneering works by Chaney (2005) and Manova (2008) , in this paper we take a step forward to identify that a …rm's credit constraints are one of the most important channels through which a …rm's productivity a¤ects its exports.
Firms have heterogeneous capabilities in obtaining external …nance. Firms with higher productivity would be more capable of obtaining loans. The intuition is straightforward.
First, the more e¢ cient …rms are expected to have higher probability of success in export projects. Thus for the same size loan and the same amount of repayment, …nancial intermediaries are more likely to extend loans to …rms with higher productivity because it is more likely that the intermediaries will be repaid. With projects with low probability of success, investors expect higher risks and thus are reluctant to extend loans to these projects. Incapable of obtaining external …nance, less e¢ cient …rms would face more severe credit constraints and might be prevented from entering the export market, or they have to export less if they also face credit constraints in …nancing variable costs as well.
In addition to borrowing from …nancial intermediaries, …rms are able to …nance internally with their domestic pro…ts. Aside from this, one interesting observation is that the …rm's type also plays a role to its access to alternative sources of …nance. One good example is that foreign-invested-enterprises (FIEs) in China, compared with non-FIEs, may have easier access to funds from their parent …rms. 1 As a result, FIEs are expected to export more given all other constants. Indeed, the share of exports by FIEs in China increased from 48% in 2000 to 57% in 2007. The average annual growth rate (i.e., 29.6%) is higher than that of China's total exports (i.e., 25%) during 2000-2007. In summary, all else equal, it is easier for …rms to enter the export market if they have higher productivity, easier access to external …nance from …nancial intermediaries, or easier access to alternative sources of funds.
In this paper, we …rst theoretically show that …rms that have higher probabilities of success probabilities, especially FIEs, are less …nancially constrained and thus less likely to be prevented from exporting. The intuition is that, when …rms need to borrow from …nan-cial intermediaries, the low probability of success leads to high repayment requirements by the intermediaries to cover investment risks. This in turn increases the export threshold.
Therefore, …rms that otherwise are productive enough to export could be prevented from exporting due to higher requirements for repayment. FIEs that have access to alternative funds from their parent …rms need to borrow less and are less sensitive to external …nance.
In this sense, FIEs are less credit constrained.
We evaluate the importance of access to external …nance to …rms'export behaviors by testing two hypotheses: (1) Firms for which it is easier to borrow from …nancial intermediaries export more; and (2) FIEs export more and are less sensitive to the availability of external …nance from …nancial intermediaries. By choosing …rms'interest expenditures as a proxy for …rms'external …nancing capabilities, we are able to explore the nexus among interest expenditures, access to foreign capital, and exports. Equally importantly, we also pin down the e¤ect of foreign capital access on exports through the channel of credit constraints. All the estimation results have the expected sign, are statistically signi…cant and are robust to di¤erent speci…cations.
Finally, we address the endogeneity issue of the e¤ect of the …rm's exports on its interest expenditures. The main idea is that, with more exports, …rms need more upfront …xed costs. We choose the scale-weighted money supply in the previous period as an 5 instrument of interest expenditures. Various statistical tests con…rm that the instrument is well justi…ed. After controlling for endogeneity problems, interest expenditures are shown to have an even greater impact on …rms'exports.
Motivated by these observations, in the next section we develop a general equilibrium model aimed at capturing the impact of a …rm's credit constraints on its exports.
The Model

Domestic Demand and Production
The economy consists of two countries, Home and Foreign (henceforth foreign counterparts of the variables are denoted with an asterisk ). Labor is the only input factor for production. The population is of size L at home. There are two sectors. One sector produces a single homogeneous good that is freely traded. Production in this sector is characterized by constant returns to scale with q 0 = wl 0 where l 0 is the labor used to produce quantity q 0 of the good. Thus labor productivity in this sector determines the wage level, w at home.
We assume that both countries produce in this sector and that wages are thus …xed by the productivity in this sector. The second sector produces a continuum of di¤erentiated goods as in Melitz (2003) . Each …rm supplies one of these goods and is a monopolist of its variety.
As in Melitz (2003) , consumers are endowed with one unit of labor and the preference over the di¤erentiated good displays constant elasticity of substitution. The utility function of the representative consumer is
where ! denotes each variety and is the set of varieties available to the consumer. The utility has a Cobb-Douglas form with share 1 on the numeraire sector. The constant elasticity of substitution across each variety in the non-numeraire sector is denoted by 6 (> 1). The aggregate price index at home is thus
where p (!) is the price of each variety. Accordingly, the demand for each variety is
and the revenue of each …rm is
where wL is the total expenditure on the di¤erentiated good at home.
Firms face a …xed cost of entering the domestic market (C d ), which can be fully …nanced by using their internal liquidity. The cost function of serving the domestic market is
where x is the productivity of the …rm. As is common for monopolistic competition, each …rm sets the domestic price, p d , with a constant mark-up 1 over the unit cost
Therefore, …rms generate pro…ts at home:
where r d (x) is the …rms'domestic revenues. In order to survive in the domestic market, …rms must have high enough productivity so that they can make positive pro…ts. The cut-o¤ productivity level, x d , is determined by the zero pro…ts condition, 
The Decision to Export
When a …rm wants to export, the upfront …xed cost, wC E , can be …nanced internally using a fraction, d, of its domestic pro…ts d . Firms could also use a certain amount of zero-interest, zero-collateral funding from the parent …rm if the …rm is a FIE. Finally, they could raise funds externally from …nancial intermediaries.
For simplicity, we assume that FIEs'parent …rms provide them a fraction of the …xed costs of the exports without interest, i w C E , where w C E is the …xed cost of exports. 2 The parameter i , 8i = F; N F , is the fraction and F; N F are the FIEs and non-FIEs, respectively. We assume that F > N F = 0 given the fact that non-FIEs do not have alternative source of funds. If the project is successful, …rms pay back this speci…c loan.
Otherwise, the loss will be covered by the parent …rms.
When …rms borrow funds from …nancial intermediaries, they face di¤erent costs. First, the export project is subject to …rm-speci…c risk and the probability of success, (x) 2 Financial contracting proceeds as follows. In the beginning of each period every …rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to a potential investor. This contract speci…es the amount the …rm needs to borrow, the repayment G E in case the project is successful, and the collateral in case of failure. Revenues are then realized and the investor receives payments at the end of the period.
The …rms maximize their expected export pro…ts, subject to four constraints:
where is the iceberg transportation cost, 1 k E is the …rm-speci…c fraction of the …xed cost that could be …nanced internally or through loans from parent …rms of FIEs.
The …rst constraint is the investor break even equation, stating that investors are perfectly competitive so they receive zero pro…ts. The second constraint indicates that, if the project is successful, the …rm must have enough net revenue to pay the repayment G E (x) to the investors. Notice that if expected exports pro…ts, E ( E (x)), are greater than or equal to zero, this constraint is not binding. The third constraint speci…es the portion of funds that need to be externally …nanced. Firms could use a fraction of domestic pro…ts and loans from parent …rms, if any, to cover part of …xed costs of the exports .
Aside from these, the leftover, k E w C E , must be …nanced externally. The last constraint is the derived demand function.
This maximization problem thus provides the sources of credit constraints. First, in order to export and make a pro…t, …rms must have the capability to generate large enough revenue so that they can o¤er a large enough repayment to investors. With a repayment that would allow investors to gain more than the break-even amount, investors would choose to extend …nancing to the …rms. If the …rm's productivity is too low, it cannot generate large enough pro…ts and hence cannot o¤er repayments that will allow the investors to break even, and thus they will not get any …nancing. Secondly, for the same level of repayment, investors are more likely to extend …nancing to …rms that have larger probabilities of success because it is more likely that they will be repaid. In sum, the easier for the …rm to get external …nancing, the more likely that the …rm enters the export market.
The investor's break-even equation determines the repayment that investors demand:
We substitute (3) into …rm's expected pro…ts
This equation indicates that as long as …rms need to borrow from investors, i.e., k E > 0, they must have higher expected pro…ts to survive in the export market. The extra cost due to credit constraints depends on the amount they borrowed (k E w C E ) and the probability of success of the project ( (x)).
The expected pro…ts maximization problem is thus equivalent to maximizing
By de…ning the operating export pro…ts as
the maximization problem is in turn equivalent to maximizing the operating exports pro…ts since productivity, domestic pro…ts, and the fraction of …xed costs covered by parent …rms are predetermined from the perspective of the …rms when they make export decisions. 4 Consequently, the results of Melitz (2003) such as the optimal price p E (x), the quantity q E (x), the operating exports pro…ts E (x), and revenue r E (x), hold for the active exporters: 5
Firms might or might not be restricted by credit constraints. If …rms have high enough productivity so that they can generate high enough domestic pro…ts, or if loans from parent …rms are high enough, so that there is no need for externally raise funds, …rms are not subject to credit constraints.
Without credit constraints, the threshold productivity level of the exporter, x E , is determined by E (x E ) = 0, or
Firms might face credit constraints. Firms with productivity level x such that
need to borrow money externally in order to enter the exports market. Within these …rms, only a subset could successfully enter the export market by making a positive expected export pro…ts. Note that if d ! 0, all …rms that want to export must raise funds externally.
The capability of …rms to secure external loans determines whether or not the …rm can export. In order to make positive expected pro…ts, …rms must have a productivity level x such that
to survive the export market. Consequently, the cut-o¤ productivity of exporting …rms that are subject to credit constraints is determined by
Compared to the cuto¤s without credit constraints in Equ. (6), credit constraints virtually "increase" the …xed costs of exports for marginal …rms, and hence the di¢ culty of entering the market increases. Solving this equation, the cuto¤ productivity for …rms subject to credit constraints is: 6
x CE = 1
Firms with productivity below x CE cannot export due to credit constraints, although some of them are su¢ ciently productive to do so pro…tably without credit constraints.
The Equilibrium
To examine the equilibrium, we assume that the price level only depends on domestic …rms'prices and that foreign …rms do not face any credit constraints by following Chaney (2005) and Muûls (2008) . This assumption indicates that
where L is the home population and F (x) is the cumulated density function of the …rm's productivity at home. Given that the cut-o¤ productivity level has an implicit form, we 6 See the appendix for details.
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de…ne the function h( ) by:
with h 0 > 0. Assuming that the distribution of productivity is the same in the foreign country as at home, F (x) = F (x), the function h( ) will be the same for the foreign country.
It turns out that the cuto¤s in equations (1), (6), and (8) are solved as: 7
; (11) where Equ. (11) indicates that x CE is an implicit decreasing function of i , which is denoted
From solutions (10) and (11), it is easy to show that x CE = x E provided that = 1.
as x N EF , where N EF stands for "no external …nance". This is because x N EF is the cuto¤ productivity level with which …rms'domestic pro…ts and parent …rms'loans are su¢ cient to …nance their …xed costs to export. That is, …rms with productivity above this level do not need any external …nance. It is worth noting that when d ! 0 as in Manova(2008) ,
In this case, all …rms need external loans in order to export. The capability of obtaining loans determines the capability of …rms to export.
is in between of x E and x N EF . From this fact, we can identify the su¢ cient condition such that there are some potential exporting …rms prevented from exporting as stated in the following proposition. 7 See the appendix.
Proposition 1 If x is continuously distributed from [0; 1], and if
then there exists a non-empty set of …rms which are prevented from exporting even though they are pro…table enough to do so if without credit constraints.
Proof. This proposition can be easily proved by substituting equation (11) and (10) into inequality x E < x CE ( i ) and making = 0. there are …nancial frictions, some of these …rms can no longer export because they cannot obtain external loans to …nance the …xed costs to export. Curves E F and E N F are the expected exports pro…ts curves for FIEs and non-FIEs, respectively. Thus, potential FIE exporters and potential non-FIE exporters that are prevented from exporting are …rms with productivity levels in the range of
These …rms cannot o¤er large enough repayments to investors and consequently cannot obtain external loans. Thus, they are prevented from exporting. Instead, FIEs and nonFIEs with productivity levels greater than x CE ( F ) and x CE ( N F ), respectively, are able 14 to obtain external loans and enter the export market. Firms with productivity levels greater than x N EF have su¢ cient domestic pro…ts to …nance the …xed costs to export internally and need not borrow from investors. However, as noted above, if the fraction of domestic pro…ts that can be used to …nance an export project is su¢ ciently small, then all exporting …rms are subject to credit constraints. Firms'capabilities of obtaining external loans then determine their capabilities of exporting.
[Insert Figure 2 Here] Therefore, our model predicts that …rms face di¤erent levels of credit constraint. The credit constraints are related to …rms'previous domestic pro…ts. They a¤ect the amount of internal liquidity that can be used to …nance the entry costs to export as suggested by Chaney (2005) . Aside from this, there still exist other important channels that a¤ect …rms'credit constraints.
First, …rms with higher productivity are more capable of obtaining external loans.
Higher productivity …rms would generate larger export revenues and thus they would be able to o¤er a larger repayment for the same amount of principal. Thus they are less credit constrained. More importantly, the higher productivity introduces the higher probability of success of the projects. As a result, investors are more likely to break even when they extend loans to more productive …rms, given the level of the principal and the repayment. Investors thus would be more inclined to extend loans to more productive …rms. Less productive …rms are then prevented from entering the export market. Again, the capability of obtaining external loans is the key to exporting in the presence of …nancial frictions. 8 Secondly, our model clearly suggests that the …rm's type plays a role in its access to alternative funds, which in turn a¤ects the …rm's export decision. Since x CE ( i ) is a decreasing function of i , …rms that have atlternative channels (e.g., FIEs get loans from their parent …rms) to obtain low-cost loans would depend less on external …nancing from …nancial intermediaries and thus have lower requirements of productivity levels to enter the export market. Given that F > N F as assumed, FIEs might be able to export more compared to non-FIEs even when they both have the identical loans from …nancial intermediates, while otherwise they would be prevented from exporting. In sum, we make the following proposition:
Proposition 2 All else equal, it is easier for …rms to ente the export market if (1) they have higher probability of success of the project and consequently easier access to external …nancing from …nancial intermediaries; or (2) they have alternative sources, other than from …nancial intermediaries, to obtain funds.
Econometrics, Data, and Measures
In this section, we …rst discuss the empirical speci…cations, followed by a description of the dataset used in the paper. We then present the results and address the possible endogeneity problem. Finally, we close the section with various robustness checks.
Empirical Spec…cation
Our theoretical model introduced above clearly predicts that it is easier for …rms with higher probability of success to get loans from …nancial intermediaries and it is thus easier for them to enter the export market. Put another way, the model predicts that …rms with larger interest expenditures, an index of their capability of obtaining loans, would export more. In addition, …rms with higher productivity also export more. We therefore consider a speci…cation as follows:
where i is the …rm and t denotes year, ln EX, ln IE, and ln T F P are the …rm's log exports, log interest expenditures, and log total factor productivity, respectively. Firms might also be able to …nance the …xed costs to export using domestic pro…ts. In order to capture this, we also include in the …rms'log domestic pro…ts (ln Dprof ). Since domestic pro…ts as well as productivity are both predetermined before the …rms make export decisions, we include values for the previous period for ln T F P and ln Dprof in the empirical speci…cation (12). 9 In contrast, current period interest expenditures a¤ect …rms'exports, Thus, we use its current realization in the empirical model.
In addition, X denotes other control variables. In particular, traditional wisdom says that SOEs in China play a signi…cant role on its economy, although this is not formally speci…ed in the theoretical model. To shed light on this point, we also include a dummy for SOEs and its interaction term with interest expenditures, SOE i ln IE it , in the model.
Finally, all other unspeci…ed factors are absorbed in the error term, which can be decomposed into the three following components: (1) …rm-speci…c …xed e¤ects & i to control for time-invariant factors; (2) year-speci…c …xed e¤ects # t to control for …rm-invariant factors; and (3) an idiosyncratic e¤ect it with normal distribution it s N (0; 2 i ) to control for other unspeci…ed factors. The impact of credit constraints on exports is the focus of this paper; thus the coe¢ cient of 1 is our main interest.
Data
The sample used in this paper comes from a rich …rm-level panel dataset which covers more than 160,000 manufacturing …rms It covers two types of manufacturing …rms: (1) all SOEs; (2) non-SOEs whose annual sales are more than …ve million yuan. 10 The dataset includes more than 100 …nancial variables listed in the main accounting sheets of all these …rms. 11 Although this dataset contains rich information, a few samples in the dataset are noisy and misleading due, in large part, to the misreporting by some …rms. 12 For example, information on some family-based …rms, which usually did not set up formal accounting systems, is based on a unit of one yuan, whereas the o¢ cial requirement is a unit of 1,000 yuan. Following Je¤erson et al. (2008), we clean the sample and rule out outliers by using the following criteria: …rst, observations whose key …nancial variables (such as total assets, net value of …xed assets, sales, gross value of industrial output) cannot be missing; otherwise, they will be dropped. Secondly, the number of employees hired for a …rm must not be less than 10 people 13 .
Following Cai and Liu (2009) , and guided by the General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), we delete observations if any of the following rules are violated: (1) the total assets must be higher than the liquid assets; (2) the total assets must be larger than the total …xed assets; (3) the total assets must be larger than the net value of the …xed assets; (4) a …rm's identi…cation number cannot be missing and must be unique; and (5) 1 0 Indeed, aggregated data on the industrial sector in the annual China's Statistical Yearbook by the Natural Bureau of Statistics (NBS) are compiled from this dataset. the established time must be valid. In particular, observations in which the opening year is after 2007 or the opening month is later than December or earlier than January are dropped as well.
Since FIEs as well as SOEs play a signi…cant role in our model, it is an advantage to take a careful look at these …rms. We …rst construct a dummy for foreign-invested …rms (F IEs)
to distinguish domestic from non-domestic …rms. Here, we consider a broad classi…cation of FIEs. In particular, the FIEs include both foreign …rms and Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan (H/M/T)-owned …rms. 14 In a robustness check, we consider a narrower classi…cation of FIEs by excluding the H/M/T-owned …rms. Turning to the dummy for SOEs, 15 to avoid a possible "adverse selection" problem faced by small SOEs in borrowing external loans, we use "above-scale" SOEs as a default sample by dropping SOE observations whose operation scales are smaller than the "above-scale" threshold. In particular, the observations are dropped if any of following indicators is lower than 5 million yuan: (1) the value of the …rm's sales; or (2) the value of the total assets; or (3) the value of the …xed assets. In robustness checks, we include all SOEs.
After this very rigorous …lter, we obtain a sample of 1; 294; 596 observations from the original sample of 1; 898; 958, which accounts for 69.2% of the original dataset. 16 ; and state-owned limited corporations. 1 6 Including small-and medium-sized SOEs whose scales are lower than the threshold would increase our sample to 1,401,569, which accounts for around 73.8% of the original size of the dataset.
Panel A of Table 1 provides some basic statistical information about the Chinese …rm data. After the …lter, the number of "above-scale" FIEs is 273; 160, which accounts for 21.1% of the full samples. In particular, the number of FIEs excluding H/M/T-owned …rms is 132; 826, 10.2% of all "above-scale" …rms. The remaining 79% are domestic …rms, of which 9.1% are SOEs and 5.8% are "above-scale" SOEs.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
In the sample, some …rms export while some do not. Only 360; 106 …rms have positive exports, which accounts for 27.7% of all "above-scale" …rms. However, 880; 026 …rms, a 67.3% of all …rms, have positive interest expenditures. We plot the logarithm of exports against the logarithm of interest expenditures at the SIC 2-digit industrial level as shown in Figure 1B . We can clearly observe a positive correlation between exports and interest expenditures across sectors. It seems di¢ cult to …nd obvious outliers in the scatter plots.
This suggests that the positive correlation between the two is unlikely due to outliers.
Finally, a …rm's domestic pro…ts are measured as the di¤erence between the …rm's overall pro…ts and its export value. A …rm's productivity is measured by using both total factor productivity (TFP) and labor productivity. In particular, the measure of TFP, by de…nition, requires that …rms' output be measured by real but not nominal terms.
Following Amiti and Konings (2007), we therefore use China's PPI at the SIC 2-digit level as the de ‡ator to convert data from nominal terms to real terms. To be consistent with other data, the base year of the de ‡ator is also chosen as 2000.
Measures of TFP
As one of the most important control variables in our regressions, it is essential for us to measure TFP precisely. However, many existing works on measuring TFP show that it is imprecise and biased (Amiti and Konings, 2007) .
TFP is usually measured as the Solow residual, de…ned as the di¤erence between the observed output and its …tted value calculated via OLS. However, this method su¤ers from 20 two biases: a simultaneity bias and a selection bias. The …rst bias comes from the fact that a pro…t-maximizing …rm would readjust its input decision as a response to productivity shocks that are observed by …rms but not by econometricians. Second, all …rms covered in the samples are those that have relatively high productivity and survived during the period of investigation. Those …rms that had low productivity, shut down, and left the market were not observed nor included in the sample. Put another way, the sample covered in the regressions is not randomly selected. Hence, all related estimates would su¤er from a selection bias.
To overcome these two empirical challenges, we use the augmented Olley-Pakes (1996) approach to estimate and calculate the …rms'TFP. Given China's WTO accession in 2001, which was a positive demand shock for China's exports, we also include a WTO dummy in the Olley-Pakes estimations to capture the e¤ect of the WTO accession. We report the detailed estimation procedure in Appendix B.
Appendix Table B also presents the estimated survival probability of the …rms in the next year by industry at the SIC 2-digit level. Its mean of 0.993 suggests that the problem of …rms'exiting is not so severe during this period. The rest of Appendix Table B reports the di¤erence in the estimated coe¢ cients for labor, material, and capital by using a regular OLS approach and the OP methodology. We cover 36 manufacturing industries coded from 6 to 46, according to China's new industrial classi…cations (GB/T4754), which were adopted in 2002. 17 Compared to the original …rm-level dataset, four industries are not covered after this …lter process. 18 1 7 Firm data before 2002 were clustered into industrial data by adopting the old industrial classi…cation. We concord such data so that they are consistent with data after 2002. 1 8 The …ve industries dropped include extraction of petroleum and natural gas (7), mining of other ores (11), processing of food from agricultural products (12) , and recycling and disposal of waste (43). 21 Table 2 presents the estimation results for equation (12) . To consider the e¤ect of a …rm's interest expenditures on its exports, we …rst run a simple OLS regression of …rms'exports on …rms' log interest expenditures, log TFP in the previous year, and FIE dummy as a benchmark. The estimated coe¢ cient^ 1 in equation (12) is :290, which is signi…cant at the conventional statistical level. This suggests that a one percentage increase in a …rm's interest expenditures is associated with a :290 percentage increase in its exports. The benchmark …nding is consistent with the simple cross-sectional plot in Figure 1B . The positive e¤ect of TFP is also consistent with the previous …ndings like those of Bernard and Jensen (1999) that …rms with higher productivity export more.
Empirical Results
Main Estimation Results
In Column (1), we also observe that FIEs are shown to export more than non-FIEs.
However, the …nding that FIEs have more exports could be due to their quick learning, better technology adoption, or higher quality inputs (Amiti and Konings, 2007), or even simply because they are established to export per se. However, FIEs might export more because of their easier access to low-cost loans (e.g., …nancial support from their parent …rms). If this is correct, FIEs should be less sensitive to external …nance. Similarly, it is also interesting to ask whether SOEs export more compared to non-SOEs and check whether or not they are sensitive to external …nance.
We then consider a speci…cation including four more variables: the SOEs dummy, the interaction terms between FIEs and the log interest expenditure (F IE i ln IE it ) and between SOEs and log interest expenditures (SOE i ln IE it ), and the …rm's log domestic pro…t in the previous period (ln Dprof it 1 ). The OLS estimation results show that the interaction term between FIEs and interest expenditures is negative, which suggests that exports of FIEs, compared to those of non-FIEs, are less sensitive to external …nance.
The variable of FIEs itself is positively correlated with exports as expected. In addition, 22 the signi…cantly positive sign of a …rm's domestic pro…ts is consistent with the prediction suggested by the theoretical model: …rms with high predetermined domestic pro…ts do not su¤er from credit constraints as much and hence they export more.
In addition, the signi…cant negative sign of SOEs suggests that SOEs, compared to non-SOEs, do not export more. There exist several possible reasons for this …nding. First, China's SOEs may su¤er from an ine¢ cient incentive mechanism (Lin, 2003) . Secondly, the SOEs enjoyed less preferential treatment in access to external …nance after China's WTO accession in 2001 (Bajona and Chu, 2004) . Accordingly, SOEs have lower productivity and export less.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Aside from the variables introduced above, other variables may a¤ect a …rm's exports as well, though they are not speci…ed in the theoretical model for simplicity. Such variables include time-varying but …rm-insensitive factors like Chinese yuan (RMB) appreciation. 19 Similarly, some other unspeci…ed time-invariant but …rm-varying factors like a …rm's location may also have impact on the …rm's exports. To control for such factors, we include both year-speci…c and …rm-speci…c …xed e¤ects in the estimations. Table 2 report the …xed-e¤ect estimation results. Since the dummies of FIEs and SOEs are time invariant, they are automatically dropped from the estimations. In all speci…cations, the …rm's TFP is shown to be signi…cantly positively associated with its exports. The key coe¢ cients^ 1 are all positive and signi…cant at the conventional statistical levels. In terms of economic magnitude, the coe¢ cients of the …rms'interest expenditures in Columns (3) is much smaller than the coe¢ cients in Column (1). However, after including more control variables,^ 1 in Column (4) is close to its counterpart in Column (2). Aside from this, most other control variables in Columns (1)- (4) have the expected signs, though they are insigni…cant. We suspect that the in- 1 9 Chinese yuan was revaued against the US dollar by around 20% during 2005-2007. signi…cance is due to the lack of a control for the endogeneity of interest expenditures, which will be handled shortly.
Columns (3) and (4) of
The Zero Trade Problem
As mentioned above, more than 73% of …rms had zero exports in our sample. and SOEs turns to be signi…cantly negative. However, the interaction term between FIEs and interest expenditures has a strikingly positive sign. We again suspect that this is due to the lack of consideration of the endogeneity of interest expenditures. We now turn to this issue.
Endogeneity Issues
A …rm's interest expenditures are not exogenously given, but a¤ected by its exports.
With more exports, …rms need more upfront …xed costs (e.g., …rms need to have a greater distribution network abroad when its exports increase), which in turn require …rms to obtain more debt to do business. One needs to control for the endogeneity of interest 24 expenditures in order to obtain accurate estimated e¤ects of a …rm's interest expenditures on exports. Otherwise, the related estimates would be suspect. Instrumental variable (IV) estimation is a powerful econometric method that can address this problem. 20 An economic indicator, a …rm's weighted monetary supply, is constructed to serve as the instrument for interest expenditures. This indicator is de…ned as (l ijt 1 = P i2j l ijt 1 )M 1 t 1 , where l ijt 1 is the number of employees of …rm i in industry j, P i2j l ijt 1 is the total number of employees in industry j, and M 1 t 1 is China's base monetary supply (M 1) in the previous year t 1. The last row in Table 1 lists the basic statistical information for this indicator. 21 The intuition is straightforward. Monetary expansion increases the supply of investments, making external …nance less costly. As a result, …rms would …nance more externally and interest expenditures would increase. Moreover, marginal …rms, i.e., previous credit constrained …rms, are now able to borrow from …nancial intermediaries and they might be able to enter the export market. Since the money supply is exogenous to exports but it a¤ects interest expenditures, it makes good economic sense to use it as an IV. We note that the previous-period money supply is used to construct the IV based on the fact that the monetary policy has a time lag to take e¤ect. 22 However, the e¤ects of monetary expansion on external …nance are not homogeneous across …rms. Larger …rms might be more competitive in the competition for loans and thus they may enjoy larger bene…ts from easier access to external …nance. We therefore 2 0 The IV approach is a good way to control for endogeneity issues. Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 5) provided a careful scrutiny of this topic. 2 1 For robustness, we construct an alternative indicator using a …rm scale, relative to the total economy, as a weight of the monetary supply. The results are similar. 2 2 One may worry that monetary expansion might not a¤ect the external …naning of small-sized …rms in China, because they might not have any access to formal …nancial intermediaries whatsoever. However, this is not a severe problem for two reasons. First, monetary expansion stimulates investments from informal …nancial intermediaries as well. Small-sized …rms would have easier external …nancing from these intermediaries following a monetary expansion. Secondly, all observation used in the default sample are "above-scale" …rms, which usually have access to formal …nancial intermediaries. We will include smalland midium-sized …rms later for robustness check.
consider a …rm's relative size when constructing the IV. One might worry that a …rm's sales, a usual index for measuring a …rm's scale, is highly correlated with the dependent variable (i.e., the …rm's exports) and hence not exogenous. We address this concern by using the number of employees as a proxy for a …rm's size. More importantly, we use its industrial weight, l ijt 1 = P i2j l ijt 1 , rather than the national economy's weight, to control for …rm size. 23 In this way, it is less likely that the level of exports is highly correlated with the weight. Indeed, their simple correlation is very small in our sample (corr = :04).
Also, as observed in Panel B of Table 1 , the log of the weighted money supply has a small simple correlation with the log of exports (corr = :39), which is much lower than the simple correlation between the log of the weighted money supply and the log of the interest expenditure (corr = :49).
We perform several tests to verify the quality of our instrument. First, we checked whether the excluded instrument (i.e., the …rm's weighted monetary supply) is "relevant".
That is, whether this instrument is correlated with the endogenous regressor (i.e., interest expenditures). In our econometric model, the error term is assumed to be heteroskedastic: Secondly, we also tested whether or not the weighted monetary supply is weakly correlated with interest expenditures. If so, then the estimates will perform poorly in the IV estimate. The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) F-statistics provide strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the …rst stage is weakly identi…ed at a highly signi…cant level. 24 2 3 The reason for using industrial weight and not national weight (lit 1= P i lit 1) is that, in China, the competition to borrow from banks is usually stronger in the same industry. However, using a national weight to construct the IV also delivers very similar …ndings, which are not reported here to save space but available upon request. 2 4 Note that the Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistic is no longer valid since it only works under the Third, the Anderson and Rubin (1949) 2 statistics reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cient of the endogenous regressor is equal to zero. In short, these statistical tests
give su¢ cient evidence that the instrument performs well, and therefore, the speci…cation is well justi…ed.
The IV …xed-e¤ects estimates in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show that, after controlling for endogeneity, interest expenditures still have a positive e¤ect on a …rm's exports. In particular, the corresponding coe¢ cients of the IV (i.e., the logarithm of the lagged weighted money supply) in the …rst stage are also statistically signi…cant and positive as expected. Their …rst-stage excluded F-statistics are de…nitely high enough to pass the F-tests. The coe¢ cients^ 1 are higher than their counterparts in Table 2 without controlling for the endogeneity. The elasticity of a …rm's interest expenditures on its exports is around a unit, which clearly suggests that high interest expenditures lead to more exports.
Equally important, in Column (2), the interaction term between FIEs and interest expenditures is^ 4 = :256; which is signi…cant at the conventional level, indicating that FIEs face less severe credit constraints. On average, a one percentage increase of non-FIEs'
interest expenditure leads to a 1:068 percentage increase in its exports, ceteris paribus. By way of comparison, a one percentage increase in an FIE's interest expenditures leads to a :812 percentage increase in its exports since 1:068 :256 = :812. Similarly, the interaction term between SOEs and interest expenditures is signi…cantly negative, which is consistent with the PPML …xed-e¤ect …nding in Table 2 . The economic rationale, arguably, is that, compared to non-SOEs, SOEs are less sensitive to external …nance due in part to their relatively easier access to subsidies or low-cost loans from the government.
After controlling for the endogeneity and …xed e¤ects, the coe¢ cient of domestic pro…ts in Column (2) has a very small magnitude with an unexpected but insigni…cant sign. To some extent, this serves as side evidence that domestic pro…ts is not a important channel
through which …rms …nance their …xed costs for exports. Instead, the main channel to alleviate the credit constraints is borrowing externally.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Additional Robustness Checks
Estimates with Narrower De…nition of FIEs
As discussed above, being an FIE is important to a …rm's exports in the sense that being such can introduce alternative …nancing channels such as funding from parent …rms. To shed light on this point, we use a broad classi…cation of FIEs in the estimations above.
That is, …rms with funding from H/M/T are considered as foreign-invested …rms. Given that Hong Kong is one of the most important sources of China's foreign direct investment, our estimations so far thus provide a upper bound for the role of FIEs in exports. Yet, it is still a plus to understand the e¤ect of FIEs on exports if we exclude the impact of funding from H/M/T.
We therefore rede…ne a narrow classi…cation of FIEs by excluding H/M/T-owned …rms and present the corresponding estimation results in Column (3) of Table 3 . Compared with the …ndings in Column (2) using the broad de…nition of FIEs, the e¤ect of interest expenditures is slightly larger:^ 1 = 1:123. In contrast, the e¤ect of the interaction term, F IE i ln IE it , is much lower. These …ndings together suggest that a one percentage increase in FIEs'interest expenditures leads to a percentage increase in its exports since 1:123 :157 = :966. This makes good economic sense. With fewer alternative channels through which to raise …nancing, …rms, on average, have to rely much more on external borrowing to …nance their …xed costs for exports.
Estimates Using "All-Scale" Data
As mentioned above, the data used for the estimations above are all "above-scale" because they include …rms with annual sales higher than 5 million yuan. One advantage of using 28 all "above-scale" data is to avoid a possible "adverse selection" problem. In China, it is di¢ cult for small-and medium-sized …rms to obtain external funds since …nancial intermediaries like banks are usually unwilling to lend to them due to the high risk of default.
However, large …rms usually do not have this problem.
The trade-o¤ of using "above-scale" data is that the role of SOEs is over-estimated since some small-and medium-sized SOEs are dropped. Equally importantly, the problem of the exiting of …rms cannot be well controlled: it does not necessarily mean that a large …rm that was included in the early years of the study period but is not included in the later years and exited from the market. It could be just that its scale is smaller in the later period than the "above-scale" threshold and hence not counted in the truncated dataset.
As observed in Table 1 , once we consider the small-and medium-sized SOEs, the number of SOEs increases to 127; 598, which accounts for 9.1% of the sample. When including small-and medium-sized SOEs, we …rst recalculated …rms'average Olley-Pakes(1996)-type TFP, and then performed all related estimations. The results are reported in Column (4) Table 3 . All coe¢ cients have identical signs as the previous …ndings. The e¤ect of interest expenditures for non-FIEs on exports,^ 1 , is shown to be smaller than the estimates using the "above-scale" data. However, the e¤ect of interest expenditures for FIEs on exports, 1 +^ 4 , are insensitive to the estimation results using the "above-scale" data. In any case, our previous …ndings of the positive impact of interest expenditures on exports is robust.
Estimates without Productivity
Regardless of di¤erent empirical speci…cations, all the estimates from Tables 2 and 3 show that higher productivity leads to more exports. Our theoretical model also clearly shows that a …rm's pre-realized productivity is the main driving force for exporting. With higher productivity, the probability of success is higher a …rm's project, which in turn helps the …rm to secure outside loans and to export more. In short, credit constraints are one of the channels by which …rm's productivity a¤ect its exports.
It is interesting to consider the importance of the channel of credit constraints in relation to other channels. After controlling for …xed e¤ects and reverse causality of interest expenditures, Column (2) of Table 3 shows that the economic magnitude of interest expenditures is much higher than TFP (e.g., in column (5),^ 1 = 1:068 whereas^ 2 = :156
) .
This raises a question: if ignoring the impacts of other channels of productivity on exports, do credit constraints pick up the residual e¤ects of productivity on exports? If so, then our estimations would be suspect since they are sensitive to di¤erent speci…cations.
By dropping the variable of productivity, Columns (1)- (3) of Table 4 provide more evidence on this point. We report the estimation results using di¤erent econometric methods: OLS, Fixed-E¤ects, and Fixed-e¤ect IV. All of the results obtained from these methods are not substantially quantitatively di¤erent from their counterparts in Tables 2 and 3 . In particular, the IV …xed-e¤ect estimates in Column (3) of Table 4 show that the magnitude of interest expenditures by excluding the variable of TFP,^ 1 = 1:063, is almost identical to its counterpart in Column (2) of Table 3 with the presence of TFP:^ 1 = 1:068. This thus provides strong evidence that interest expenditures do not pick up the residual e¤ect of productivity on a …rm's exports.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Estimation with Labor Productivity
In the previous section, we use total factor productivity (TFP) to measure productivity since it is close to reality. However, since our theoretical model essentially is a one-input (i.e., labor) Krugman (1979) model, it is useful to use labor productivity to measure productivity as well. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 report the estimation results using labor productivity to measure productivity.
As shown in Column (4), with the control of both …rm-speci…c and year-speci…c …xed e¤ects, the coe¢ cient of labor productivity, :174, is smaller than its counterpart in Column 30 (4) of Table 2 : :204. The result makes good economic sense given that labor is only one of the inputs. After controlling for the endogeneity of a …rm's interest expenditures, the IV …xed-e¤ects estimates in Column (5) also present the anticipated positive sign. However, it is insigni…cant, which in turn suggests that the TFP may be a more ideal measure of a …rm's productivity.
Additional Estimates with Ratio Speci…cations
Thus far, all estimates suggest that high interest expenditures lead to more exports. Yet, the key variables in the estimates above are measured by levels. It is useful to consider estimations with ratio speci…cations to check if our previous …ndings hold. We therefore take the log ratio of a …rm's exports to its sales as the regressand. By the same token,
we construct the log ratio of interest expenditures to sales and the log ratio of domestic pro…ts to sales as the regressors. We then perform the Fixed-e¤ects and IV …xed-e¤ects estimations to reconsider the impact of credit constraints on exports.
Columns (1) of Table 5 presents the …xed-e¤ects estimation results for our three key variables: interest expenditures, TFP, and the interaction term between interest expenditures and FIEs. We can clearly observe that, even when measured in ratios, all coe¢ cients still have the anticipated signs and are statistically signi…cant. Adding more control variables in Column (2) does not change our …ndings qualitatively. After controlling for the endogeneity issue, estimates in Columns (3) and (4) are still in line with our previous …ndings. The only slightly surprising …nding is that, in Column (4), the coe¢ cients on the ratio of interest expenditures to sales and TFP are insigni…cant. However, they still have the anticipated positive signs. In sum, all our robustness checks suggest that our …ndings are robust regardless of speci…cation.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
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In this paper, we …rst constructed a theoretical model to consider how a …rm's credit constraints a¤ect its exports. Firms with higher productivity have higher probabilities for success of its projects. They thus are more capable of obtaining external …nance from …nancial intermediates. Consequently, they are less credit constrained and are able to export more abroad. Moreover, FIEs are less sensitive to the availability of external …nance since they have access to funds from their foreign parent …rms.
We then test the theoretical predictions using a very rich Chinese …rm-level dataset.
After controlling for productivity and the endogeneity of a …rm's capacity for external borrowing, we …nd strong empirical evidence to support our theoretical argument. In particular, …rms that are more capable of obtaining external …nance are shown to have higher levels of exports. Moreover, the exports of FIEs are less sensitive to the …rm's access to external …nance from …nancial intermediaries. All of these …ndings are robust to di¤erent measures and econometric settings.
Our work enriches our understanding of impact of productivity on exports. Productivity could a¤ect exports through credit constraints. Di¤erent productivity levels induce di¤erent project-speci…c success probabilities. Observing this, …nancial intermediaries prefer to extend …nancing to projects with less risk, given the same levels of principal and repayment. Thus, …rms with higher productivity face less severe credit constraints and are able to export and to export more. In short, higher productivity leads to easier access to external …nance, and, consequently, to more exports.
Our work contributes to the literature in three important ways. First, our theoretical model suggests that project-speci…c risk leads to di¤erent levels of credit constraints faced by …rms. Secondly, empirically, we o¤er …rm-level evidence that credit constraints are an important determining factor of a …rm's exports. Firms with easier access to external …nance or alternative sources of funds face fewer credit constraints, and, consequently, they 32 export more. Thirdly, we o¤er evidence that foreign capital in ‡ow a¤ects …rms'exports through credit constraints.
Several extensions and possible generalizations merit special consideration. One of them is to consider outward foreign direct investment (FDI) into the model in the sense that …rms with higher productivity would perform outward FDI in addition to exports.
Another possible extension is to consider how policy shocks like exchange rate changes a¤ect a …rm's exports and FDI decisions in the presence of credit constraints. These are the topics that we will pursue in the future. (
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In equilibrium, by substituting in P and P , we can solve the cuto¤s: Notes: I do not report standard errors for each coe¢ cient to save space, which are available upon request.
